8
Mapping the Thatcherite legacy: the human geography of social inequality in Britain since the 1970s

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Introduction

British academics of my generation, and some a great deal younger, are often fascinated by Thatcherism and its legacy. When reviewing Peter Dorey’s book, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality, Emily Robinson (2011) explained that the book helped answer Kevin Hickson’s plea for more work to be done on the Conservatives’ attitudes to inequality:

As both Hickson and Dorey point out, Conservative positions on inequality have often been mistaken for an offshoot of pragmatism: given that inequality exists, an acceptance of it can easily be seen as simply realistic. However, as both go on to demonstrate, the defence – and even promotion – of inequality are core tenets of Conservative thinking. In fact, as Dorey’s title suggests, this could be seen as the defining feature of British Conservatism, uniting the party across the lines of moderation and radicalism, paternalism and laissez-faire.

(Robinson, 2011: 307)

The promotion of inequality, mostly as an indirect result of policy but also as a direct result of the belief that ‘tall poppies’ should not be cut down, was one of the main Thatcherite legacies (see Walker, Chapter 9 in this collection). Not just the inequality that grew under Thatcher’s actual years in office, but the beginnings of the promotion of the idea that growing inequalities were a ‘good thing’ and should be encouraged (see Figure 8.1). Following 1997, as the legacy continued, if a little muted, this led to New
Labour politicians suggesting that it was equality of opportunity that mattered most, not equality of outcomes. Equality of outcomes could diverge, or so these former (New) sons and daughters of toil (Labour) suggested, with life-chances becoming progressively more unequal, just as long as the more immeasurable ‘opportunities’ or ‘capabilities’ people had to prosper were apparently being made available and presented upon a slightly more level playing field.

Figure 8.1, and many other similar diagrams, suggest to me that the rising, and then high, period of inequality synonymous with Thatcherism began shortly after 1977 and has continued largely unabated to the present day (on periodization see Hay and Farrall, 2011). Following the coalition victory of 2010 the Thatcherite legacy of promoting inequality was renewed with extra vigour. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 was passed allowing up to half of NHS hospital beds to be privatized, for other parts of the legislation researchers later found that ‘it is not possible to do in the real world that which the bill purports to achieve’ (Jones, 2012). The state checks on the market mechanisms that the Bill proposed would not work because of random variation in short-term health outcomes. What was

Figure 8.1  Gini coefficient of equivalized inequality in income after tax and before housing costs, 1961 to 2007–8

Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies
Note: Data are for Great Britain before 2002–3 and for UK subsequently.
being offered to people after more than three decades of Thatcherism was an increased ‘opportunity’ to be lucky, win the lottery, or an inheritance, and secure access to healthcare on the basis of their economic circumstances. In education reintroductions of old-fashioned school examinations were announced to increase the opportunity children had to fail to gain any qualification from school. At the same time, social housing rules were changed to make it harder for young people in expensive cities to find shelter. In health, education and housing outcomes were becoming more unequal, but in each area it could be said that opportunities to succeed or fail were widening. To the generation that grew up under Thatcher’s initial terms of office (the ones when she was prime minister), it felt a little as though we had been here before, but this was not automatically the case. Figure 8.2 shows one view from those times.

Figure 8.2 shows an old computer graphic of unemployment rates as they stood two years after Thatcher was swept to power in 1979. The altitude of areas on the map, which itself is an equal population cartogram, is drawn in proportion to the proportion of jobless people. As area on the map is drawn in proportion to people the volume being shown is the volume of unemployed jobseekers in 1981. Note how high unemployment was in Scotland and in the far north, how a low-lying ring of relative prosperity encircled London, but how also, in general, areas around the coast often fared badly.

The recession of the early 1980s was like a social storm which swept south from the north of the UK and which, in particular, reduced men’s chances of gaining employment and of living into old age. It blew southwards, round the coasts, into inner London and the cores of some other southern cities but it was a social wind which went strangely still over the more rural parts of the Home Counties – places that never felt the economic cold. The 1980s recession had begun earlier, in the late 1970s along the Clyde and a little later on the Tyne and Mersey, but Thatcherism allowed its progress to be both encouraged and exacerbated (see figure 8.1 in Dorling, 2012, and figure 14b in Dorling, 1996).

Where there were small signs of economic weakness, in any community at any particular time, the doctrine of Thatcherism, of not ‘supporting the weak’, prised open the cracks to grow. Elsewhere in Europe industries were not repeatedly decimated so often. In Britain where there was a little discord in communities, for instance between police and other groups, these tensions were stoked to grow to hatred during the Thatcher years. Miners, football supporters, urban adolescents: all would fight pitched
The Distribution of Unemployment in Britain 1981

Rate shown as surface height, volume in proportion to the number of unemployed upon the population cartogram. Resolution 300 by 450, based on ward figures.

Figure 8.2 1980s style computer mapping of 1980s unemployment

Source: Dorling, 2012, figure 7.13
battles at some point as the authorities were egged on by the doctrine of economic efficiency.

Where error or injury had been done to communities during the initial early 1980s recession, subsequent neglect led to doubt over the future viability of poorer neighbourhoods and ensured despair among many inhabitants as levels of depression rose quickly. A kind of Victorian darkness settled in many inner-city and industrial neighbourhoods, and a new kind of sadness, but only in some places, only in some parts of Britain. Elsewhere in affluent Britain, in the places which profited, the living was more often easy and becoming easier. And, elsewhere in Europe, as Figure 8.3 shows, people shared what they had more fairly. There were fewer

\[ \text{Figure 8.3} \quad \text{Income Inequality the UK and France compared. Income share of the best-off 1%, France and UK} \]

Note: For the UK, until 1974, the estimates relate to income net of certain deductions; from 1975, estimates relate to total income. Until 1989 estimates relate to tax units but, from 1990, estimates relate to adults. Data for the UK is patchy prior to 1951.

Source: The World Top Incomes Database
winners and fewer losers. The inequality trends in Britain were not repeated nearby, especially not just across the channel in France. Looking exactly when the trend in Figure 8.3 in the UK changed – 1977/78, France has a flatter trend line.

If you were a young man brought up in relative affluence outside the urban cores of the North, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, you might think that the 1980s had been a period of great economic success. The 1980s and 1990s were not bad places to be for those in London and the South-East, or the ‘Home Counties’ and some of the commuter towns in them. For the residents of many of the smaller southern towns, increases in apparent social harmony, the reinforcement of what they saw as ‘home truths’, of their faiths and of hope in a Greater Britain in the future were common. Other places saw crime and murder rates more than double (see Farrall and Jennings, Chapter 7 in this collection; Dorling, 2005), unemployment soar (see Thompson, Chapter 2 in this collection), drug use become endemic, and the new misery set in, but that was not among ‘our people’ as Margaret Thatcher used to describe those she saw as worthy of any respect.

Mrs Thatcher

May I just thank you very much. And I would just like to remember some words of Saint Francis of Assisi . . .

Where there is discord, may we bring harmony.
Where there is error may we bring truth.
Where there is doubt, may we bring faith.
And where there is despair, hope.

(Margaret Thatcher, on taking office, 4 May 1979)

It is important not to conflate Thatcher with Thatcherism. For example, the name ‘Charles Darwin’ will now forever on be synonymous with Darwinism, a name which is now mostly an empty vessel to fill with what we now think about his ideas (Powell, 2012). So, too, Mrs Thatcher’s corporeal existence is now subsumed within others’ ideas of what it is she stood for. But it is worth looking back a little more closely at her. After misquoting St Francis, she then talked in some detail of her father. Margaret rarely mentioned having had a mother. She was an admirer of
Ronald Reagan (see Figure 8.4). It can also be useful to look back on the precursors to the rise of Thatcherism by using points in the life of the lead actor in the drama herself.

Margaret Hilda Roberts was born in 1925 during the end of an era of aristocratic inequality. When Margaret Hilda was a child she saw that adults would doff their hats in her Lincolnshire market town as their betters passed by (Waugh, 1945). Young Margaret first attended grammar school, and was then separated from most local children, just as unemployment reached new heights in 1936. After the age of 11 she would not have mixed at school with the majority of the children of her town but mostly with the daughters of the more affluent residents, which included her parents who owned two shops. Because she did not quite get the grades, it was only after one student dropped out, in 1943, that she arrived at Oxford to begin

![Figure 8.4](image-url)

Figure 8.4  Trends in Britain were similar to those seen in the USA and Canada. Income share of the best-off 1%, USA and Canada

Note: For both Canada and the USA the estimates exclude incomes from capital gains.
Source: The World Top Incomes Database

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a degree in chemistry, which she completed in 1947 (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2012). She became a mother in 1953 and an MP in 1959. Early on she was most noticed for getting in a little trouble after voting for the restoration of birching in 1961 and for helping to ensure her party was not fashionable during the swinging Sixties (Campbell, 2007). The ‘young female Member for Finchley had joined with five other Tories on the Standing Committee in support of an amendment to restore flogging moved by the 74-year-old Member for Ayr, Sir Thomas Moore. (The other five were all much older than Mrs Thatcher, three of them military or naval men)’ (2007: 134).

At age 36, in 1961, Mrs Thatcher was far from being an ordinary woman. She preferred the company and attitudes of older men from another era – she married one of those – but the reason for reeling out all these dates and reminding you that she was in favour of flogging, and hanging too, and racist anti-immigration policies (2007: 437) is not to show that she was about as politically incorrect as it is was possible to be, even by the standards of those times, but to illustrate just how quickly the world around her was changing. The figures quoted below are for the UK, but consider also Figure 8.4 from 1925 to 1961 and what was occurring at the same time in the USA where Friedrich Hayek, one of Thatcherism’s architects (and one of her favourite authors), lived from 1950 to 1962 and complained about the social progress he saw.

In 1925 the richest 1 per cent of people in the UK took home 22 per cent of all income; by 1936, as Margaret Hilda first walked to her grammar school, that grossly unfair share had fallen to 18 per cent; by 1941 as she took (and initially failed) her exams to allow her to later enter her Oxford college, the income share of the richest 1 per cent fell to ‘just’ 13 per cent; by the time she left Oxford, in 1947, that share was 11 per cent; when she first became MP (in 1953) the income share of the richest 1 per cent had fallen just below 10 per cent and, by the time she was voting with the old naval men to bring back flogging, in 1961, the richest 1 per cent were taking home less than 9 per cent of all income, nearer to 8 per cent the year after. These are very low rates of inequality for the UK, but are rates that have been enjoyed by the citizens of Japan and Germany since 1945 (Figure 8.5).

Almost every year of Margaret Roberts’s formative years, privilege and power was rapidly ebbing away from the rich in Britain. Later more equitable Germany and Japan would begin to economically supersede Britain (Thatcherites never understood the key reasons were those two
countries’ greater levels of post-war economic equality). To a young woman so rapidly social climbing, so quickly removing herself from those below her, it must have felt as if the country she was so very patriotically proud of was on a road to some kind of serfdom. The faster she rose up the ranks and climbed up the greasy pole of school and entrance exam success, with her financially appropriate marriage to Denis Thatcher, that much wealthier, older, divorcee; the faster she secured political success. However, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the monies she and those around her were gaining – by getting ahead of others, by rent-seeking and profiteering – was rapidly ebbing way. And the Germans and Japanese were moving ahead. No wonder she and ‘her people’ were angry.
In 1975, when Margaret became leader of her party, the annual incomes of the richest 1 per cent in the UK had fallen to just 6 per cent of national income for the first time in British history. The very rich, on average in that year ‘only’ received six times the arithmetic mean income of the country. Imagine a well-paid top London banker ‘only’ receiving six times what a factory worker got. You might think that was six times too much, but that was almost the lowest the UK richest 1 per cent ever reached. They reached their precise historic minima in 1978, the year before she became prime minister, the first year after which income inequality again began to

**Figure 8.6** Falls in the share of the top 1% in the Netherlands and Switzerland since 1940. Income share of the best-off 1%, Netherlands and Switzerland

Note: In the Netherlands, up to 1946, the series is based on tabulated income tax data; between 1950 and 1975, estimates are based on tabulated data produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics; from 1977 they are estimated based on micro-data from the Income Panel Survey (IPO) and using tax and other administrative data. Swiss estimates do not include capital gains.

Source: The World Top Incomes Database
The rising tide of inequality

Approaching the issues along these lines allows one to appreciate just how closely the declining fortunes of the richest 1 per cent in the UK correlated with Thatcher’s political education and then turned as she took office. Her ascendancy was the precise point at which these inequalities began again to increase. Of course it was not just her. She was mostly a symbol for the men behind her, those who backed her and thrust her forward, and of the ideas of men like Hayek, von Mises (1975), and others so shattered by the events of the Second World War that they thought that almost any government, planning or sharing was evil.

Thatcherism is not about a woman but about a trend that the politics associated with this surname gave rise to. It was a trend she was part of, a trend which began before she was born and which carried on long after she had left office. It is a historically interesting question to ask just how much this politician, brought up in a remote market town, trained in chemistry (not PPE) and married into the class she would later benefit most, understood of what was happening to British society before she gained power or even became Education Secretary, but she rallied against the status quo and was the Thatcherites’ symbol of a powerful force for change.

Figure 8.7 shows just how important Thatcherism was for fundamentally changing UK society and, key here, that society’s human geography. It is a more detailed version of one of the lines in Figure 8.3, but showing more than just the best-off 1 per cent. The top graph is dominated by the black line, which is the average income of the very richest of all, of the best-off 0.01 per cent of all people in the UK. Around 1912, the richest, on average, each received over 400 times mean average incomes (much more again than the median average). Today the very richest see their share heading back up towards 150 times the mean. We might even be tempted to a little speculation as to whether Thatcherism might be ending now (see the blip at the end of Figure 8.7), but it is too early to tell. The economic crises of 2008–12 could be its death throes. To paraphrase what the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai said in commenting on changes in France in 1968, or in the UK 2008, ‘It is too early to say.’ What we can be sure of is the temporal coincidence between the all-time low in the incomes of the very richest,
Figure 8.7 Incomes of the best-off in the UK 1910–2009 (top half). Incomes of the best-off in the UK 1910–2009 (compared to average, on linear & log scales) (bottom half)

and Mrs Thatcher’s elevation to power just after 1978. In terms of defining a pivot point, few graphs showing social changes are as clear as Figure 8.7.

Figure 8.7 shows the most basic set of consistent measures we have of economic inequalities in Britain that span almost a century in time. Missing values have been interpolated here (for details of that process and similar trends in other social measures see Dorling, 2013). They are interpolated to present a picture that is simpler than it would otherwise look. However, the overall trend is clear: inequalities were huge, fell consistently for 70 years and then rose consistently for 30 years. The pivot point was 1978. The later parting of the ways between ‘the 9 per cent’ and ‘the 1 per cent’ after 1990 is the other major feature of note and the very recent falls in the remuneration of the very best-off of all will require careful and close attention in the immediate years to come. Thatcherism could be ending now, even with arch-Thatcherites in power.

It is this graphic (Figure 8.7) which best explains the importance of Thatcherism. In other countries the same graph shows a different trend which behaves in very different ways. In many countries inequalities carry on falling throughout the 1980s and 1990s, just as earlier in this chapter the case of the Netherlands and Switzerland was described (see Figure 8.6). There is almost nothing at all ‘international’ in the temporal trends revealed in Figure 8.7. In fact, nowhere else in Europe is the same as the UK when it comes to inequality profiles and projections. Only the USA and, to a lesser extent, Canada have similar trajectories, and in both of those cases equalization was not progressing throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as was the case in the UK, but only began with the advent of the Second World War. Because the graphs in Figure 8.7 show how many times average incomes members of the richest tenth, 1 per cent, 0.1 per cent and 0.01 per cent of society receive in income a year, greater changes in the futures of just one group can be overshadowed by larger changes for others. For ‘the 1 per cent’ their multiple of average income is identical to their share of national income. If the top 1 per cent received ten times average incomes then they receive 10 per cent of all income. Groups above the top 1 per cent can enjoy incredible incomes because there are fewer of them. The top 1 per cent can never enjoy much more than 25 per cent of all income as, above that, those at the very bottom begin to starve.

As Thatcher came to power the UK share of the top 1 per cent rose to 6 per cent in 1979, 7 per cent by 1984, 8 per cent by 1988, 9 per cent by 1990, and then there followed a very brief dip (when John Major became prime minister), then a rise following Major’s 1992 election victory to 10 per cent
by 1993, rising quickly to nearer 11 per cent by 1995, 12 per cent by 1997, rising a little slower in the first years of the New Labour government, but still to almost reach 13 per cent by 2001. Thatcherism continued after New Labour came to power, that was part of what made it ‘New’. Liberal Leader Nick Clegg would complain of this in the 2010 election campaign, but he did little while in office as Deputy Prime Minister to tackle income inequality. In office Nick Clegg was just as Thatcherite as New Labour had been.

It is true that there was a brief dip in the upwards inequality trend during Gordon Brown’s ‘progressive brief pause’ (2001–2 – blink and you missed it), before the share of the top 1 per cent began quickly rising again to 13 per cent by 2004, 14 per cent by 2005, jumping to nearer 15 per cent by 2006, 15.4 per cent by 2007 and then a third dip, to just under 14 per cent by 2009. The third dip was associated with the immediate impact of economic crash, with factors such as initially falling income from interest on stocks and shares, but we know that fall was quickly reversed, with inequality rising again in 2010 and 2011 from other reports of the income of top financiers bouncing back (the bulk of the top 1 per cent work in banking and similar services). However, by 2012 there were again signs of restraint at the top. We are currently in a period of oscillation, possibly a third tipping point after those in 1912 and 1978. Those two tipping points could only be clearly seen long after most of the events if their respective years had been forgotten. If 2008 turns out to have been the tipping point, the end of Thatcherism, which precise prime minister or political party was in power that year will no longer be seen to have been of much importance.

A geographical perspective

What is so geographical about any of this? Why go into so much detail about what appear to be historical social and economic changes in a chapter about geography? Initially, these trends appear to be purely about falling and then rising economic inequalities, but ‘the 1 per cent’ were and are not evenly spread across the country. Only slightly more evenly spread are the ‘next best-off 9 per cent’ beneath them. Those well above the bulk of the top 1 per cent are far more geographically concentrated, almost solely in and near London, which is where almost all of the 0.1 per cent and 0.01 per cent reside (see Hennig and Dorling, 2012 on the geography of 0.01 per cent). It is possible to chart how the 1 per cent became a little more evenly
spread geographically as their share of income falls and how they rapidly
geographically segregated into exclusive enclaves and southern towns,
villages and cities as they became richer again. However, it is with political
patterns and voting that the geography becomes clearer quickest, so let us
turn to that and to some more social graphics from the 1980s on geo-
ographical swings in voting to try to illustrate the effect that Thatcher’s rise
to power had.

The polarization of voting

A simple geographical measure of polarization is the segregation index
(Simpson, 2004). When applied to Conservative voters by parliamentary
constituency this index is the measure of the minimum number of
Conservative voters who would have to move constituency were all
constituencies to return an identical share of Conservative votes. (That
political party is used here because it is the most consistently defined over
this period as well as being Thatcher’s party). Table 8.1 illustrates that
people voted Conservative in remarkably similar numbers in most
constituencies between 1931 and early 1974. Elections were decided much
more by the national swing than by issues of tactical voting and political
geography. During those years one would have only had to move as few
as 4 per cent of Conservative voters, and never more than 8 per cent, to
have exactly the same number/proportion voting in each area. Six years
after economic inequalities began to fall (in 1912), the 1918 ‘Khaki’ election
saw the greatest political polarization, exacerbated by the political
machinations of the time and Liberals not standing against Tories in many
seats. As a result, as Table 8.1 shows, polarization as indicated by voter
segregation shot up to almost 20 per cent, dropping only to 14 per cent in
1922, but then fell gently downwards to almost 6 per cent by 1959 before
rising up to 8 per cent by the February election of 1974 and then suddenly
jumping to almost 11 per cent in the October election of that year.

If you want a moment when everything changed, when Thatcherism
was conceived, it was during the spring and summer months of 1974 (see
also Hay, 1996; Heffernan, 2000; and Jessop et al., 1990 on similar attempts
to identify a ‘starting point’). The economic tipping point might have been
1978, but the political tilt occurred earlier. It was then that people in the
South-east of England swung rightwards, voting polarized sharply and, a
year later, Margaret’s party would elect her as leader. Political polarization
dropped a fraction during the 1979 election itself but then rose relentlessly, subsequently to reach the post-First World War maxima in 2010. Table 8.1 above of voting polarization turns out to be a good indicator of when social divisions in general were also widening and falling.

The proportions in the table above might appear modest but you really need to see what was involved in these rises in polarization, or recognize why even the slight rise from 9.2 per cent in 1979 to 10.6 per cent in 1983 and 11.8 per cent by 1987 was shocking. Figure 8.8 shows how a political vacuum opened up in the centre of politics in Britain as voters in constituencies swung away from the political centre during these years. Labour areas became more Labour, Tory more Tory, and hence the numbers of voters rose who would have had to be moved across a political boundary to ever achieve a more even geographical distribution rose election after election.

To understand Figure 8.8 you need to know that each triangle contains the space of all possible election results in any one election. Within each triangle every constituency is placed as a dot. The precise location of the dot depends on the share of the vote between the three main parties. If most

Table 8.1 Segregation of Conservative voters 1885 to 2010 – all general elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Concentration</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Concentration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>7.11%</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>6.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>5.53%</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>6.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>5.81%</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>6.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>4.70%</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>4.39%</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 Jan</td>
<td>7.91%</td>
<td>1974 Feb</td>
<td>8.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 Dec</td>
<td>6.24%</td>
<td>1974 Oct</td>
<td>10.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>19.30%</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>14.44%</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>10.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>11.57%</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>11.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>10.62%</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>9.24%</td>
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<td>13.94%</td>
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<td>15.69%</td>
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<td>7.21%</td>
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<td>16.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>6.74%</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Source: Dorling 2010. See also: http://www.sasi.group.shef.ac.uk/injustice/files/Figure13.xls and Norman Tebbit’s objection to the measure only being shown for Conservatives (letter New Statesman, 5 July 2010: http://www.readperiodicals.com/201007/20730707111.html)
Figure 8.8  Westminster Constituency swings on the Electoral Triangle 1979–87.

Source: Dorling 2012, figure 1.8

Note: Each constituency is represented by an arrow showing how voting there changed.
of the vote is to Labour then the dot is drawn towards the bottom left of the triangle. If most of the vote is to the Conservatives then it is drawn towards the bottom right, and if most of the vote is to the various groupings of Liberal parties (SDP/Liberal/Alliance) then it is drawn further up. The vote share decides the precise position. Between any pair of elections the dot for a constituency changes position as the vote share changes within the constituency. The change on the diagram between the two dots can be shown by an arrow. The arrowhead is draw at the later election point to show the overall direction of change over time. Groups of politically similar constituencies can be seen to be ‘flocking’ as they swing in similar directions, or ‘scattering’ when there is less of a pattern to the flow of votes in voting space.

Over the 1979–87 period as a whole, Labour areas became more Labour, arrows to the left swung to the left, Conservative areas become more Conservative and, in many, the main opposition became the Liberals, SDP and later the Liberal Democrats (known at the time as ‘The Alliance’). The hole that appeared in the middle of British politics, in the middle of the triangles in Figures 8.8 and 8.9 was a political vacuum, a fall in moderation and that itself was one initial result of Thatcherism. Later on the hole filled up again as Labour moved to the right to fill it.

Trends in local election results show even more clearly the schisms that opened up under Thatcher’s period of immediate tenure. In Figure 8.9 a dot is drawn to show the vote share in every county division in England, the areas used to elect county councillors in the years 1981, 1985 and 1989. The net of an electoral tetrahedron is also shown for Scotland to illustrate how polarization within a four-party system can be visualized and how there too evidence of a political vacuum opening up could be seen by the end of this period of initial change, by 1988.

In 1981 in England the distribution of county councillors was quite even across voting space. A great many seats are shown as dots in a histogram beneath the electoral triangle as in these no Liberal Party (or Alliance) candidates stood. The size of the dots is proportional to the electorate. There is a hint of white space in the centre of the triangle as there are slightly fewer seats in which all three main parties gain a near identical share of the vote than might be expected if there were no geographical issue to voting.

By 1985 the white space in the centre has opened up a little more. County council seats were beginning to move away from the political centre of the image, at least those that were ever anywhere near that centre. The entire distribution in fact shifted a little to the edges (see original source for more
1981 County Council Elections: English Voting Composition

Every electoral division won by one of the three major parties is shown by a circle on the diagram. The area of the circle indicates the composition of votes in that division. Independent candidates are counted as Conservative where no Conservative opposed Labour or Liberal nominees.

Distance from each apex measures the support for a part from total to none. Divisions falling on the sides of the triangle are projected as a histogram of two party support.

1985 County Council Elections: English Voting Composition

Every electoral division won by one of the three major parties is shown by a circle on the diagram. The area of the circle indicates the composition of votes in that division. Independent candidates are counted as Conservative where no Conservative opposed Labour or Liberal nominees.

Distance from each apex measures the support for a part from total to none. Divisions falling on the sides of the triangle are projected as a histogram of two party support.

1989 County Council Elections: English Voting Composition

Every electoral division won by one of the three major parties is shown by a circle on the diagram. The area of the circle indicates the composition of votes in that division. Independent candidates are counted as Conservative where no Conservative opposed Labour or Liberal nominees.

Distance from each apex measures the support for a part from total to none. Divisions falling on the sides of the triangle are projected as a histogram of two party support.

1988 District Elections: Scottish Voting Composition

The triangles show the projections of a regular tetrahedron encompassing electoral ward competitions involving as many as four separate candidates. Every ward won by one of the major parties is shown as a circle on the diagram, its area in proportion to the total vote. The position of the circle indicates the composition of votes in that ward. Circles are when on the side of the tetrahedron they lie closest to. Wards falling on the edges of the tetrahedron are projected as histograms of two party support on the sides of the triangles. Distance from each apex measures the support for a party from total to none.

SNP 100%
Liberal/Alliance/SLD 100%
Conservative 100%

Figure 8.9  Local voting in England 1981–9 and in Scotland in 1988

Source: Dorling, 2012; figures 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 9.16 (of the electoral tetrahedron)
diagrams showing this, albeit in tedious detail, but using early three-
dimensional surface visualization techniques). After 1985, as all the three
main parties tried to ensure that their voters had a chance to vote for them,
everywhere, there were fewer seats placed around the edges of the triangle
and also fewer where there is a single unopposed candidate (illustrated by
the strings of seats drawn at the corners of the triangle).

What began as a shift between 1981 and 1985 became a rout between
1985 and 1989. The political centre can be seen in Figure 8.9 to almost
completely hollow out in just those four years. In hindsight, it is less
surprising that one response to the growing vacuum was the splitting of
the SDP from Labour and then its alliance with the Liberals. By 1989 county
divisions, county council seats, are either Liberal/Alliance–Tory contests
or Tory–Labour battles, and this was only if there was much of a fight to
be had at all. More areas became safe local or even very safe national seats.
The country had polarized politically, faster in the late 1980s than the early
1980s and ever since then this polarization has continued. It continued to
such an extent and degree that the Conservative party failed to gain a
majority at the 2010 national general election because so many of the extra
votes they won were piled up in areas they had already secured by 2005
(Dorling, 2010).

The final quarter of the diagram in Figure 8.9 shows how, in Scotland
and by 1988, the hole in the middle of politics was also very clear to see
north of the border, the dots representing local councillors forming a ring
around places that no longer existed, such as places where roughly a
quarter of voters each voted Tory, Liberal, Labour and SNP. In hindsight
these diagrams show when the schism was formed. They were first drawn
between 1989 and 1991 using data from just a few years before. Back then
it was far from clear just how important and semi-permanent what had just
occurred would be. The political ground shifted in the 1980s and it is still
moving in the same directions it first shuddered out towards then. Looking
at these diagrams is a little like looking at an electoral autopsy. They show
when the break first occurred.

I include all these diagrams (and Table 8.1) because if you lived through
those years as a youngster it is easy to think that your times were special
and something very unusual was occurring. However, viewed both in
hindsight and in context, something very odd, even unprecedented, in
terms of voting was occurring. Whole places were moving towards political
poles and away from the centre ground. Viewed conventionally and
geographically this is now known as the north/south divide widening; a
divide widening in voting as well as wealth, health, educational changes and employment fortunes. Viewed in detail in political space it is clear that the drifts were near universal, they were found both within the north and south as well as between them.

The new geographies of England

Thatcherism did not suddenly create a new political map. Long before Mrs Thatcher’s three governments were put in power England dominated Britain, Northern Ireland was marginalized and London reigned supreme. And this is all despite many decades of population decline within the capital. However, in the early 1970s there were a few years when the population centre of the country moved north (see Dorling and Atkins, 1995: 34, figure 16). By the 1980s that had ended. Figure 8.10 provides a single image to illustrate how dominant London was five years before the ‘Big Bang’ of financial deregulation in 1986.

After Mrs Thatcher left office the legacy of her tenure continued. Figure 8.11 shows how, during those following ten years of the 1990s, there was actual population decline in the North-west of England and around the rivers Clyde, Tyne and Tees. In contrast, the South-east, and especially London, boomed. There was, in effect ‘managed decline’ outside the core zone. This managed decline began with Michael Heseltine but continued under first John Major, and then Tony Blair, both contemporaries of Thatcher.

There was no slow-down under Tony Blair’s tenure in the economic and social polarization of the country. Table 8.2 shows how mortality rates continued to polarize – if anything a little faster under Blair than Thatcher – between areas of the country. It was migration which drove these changes. Those who could, moved. They moved towards more prosperous areas. Years later this internal migration became apparent when measured in terms of the numbers of people dying per year in each place at each age.

New Labour as ‘Thatcherism continued’

Thatcherism changed how we thought, what we aspired to. It dumbed down collective social aspiration while building up individual senses of entitlement. Towards the end of New Labour’s period of office even
Daily Commuting Flows Between English and Welsh Wards in 1981

All flows which satisfy the following inequality are drawn as thin lines

\[ \frac{m_{ij}}{p_i p_j} > \frac{1}{25000} \]

Flows of over 1000 people drawn as thick lines

Where –

\[ m_{ij} : \text{The number of people moving from place } i \text{ to } j \text{ between times } s \text{ and } t \]

\[ p_i : \text{The number of people at place } i \text{ time } s \]

\[ i : \text{Place of residence} \]

\[ j : \text{Place of work} \]

\[ s : \text{Nighttime} \]

\[ l : \text{Daytime} \]

Figure 8.10  London 1981 – all absorbing (the other ‘spider’ was Manchester)

Source: Dorling, 2012, figure 6.14
Figure 8.11 During the 1990s Thatcherism continued on the ground, if not name. London and the Home Counties grew while Merseyside, Tyneside and Clydeside continued to decline.

Source: UK population Censuses 1991 and 2001, population potential calculated for this book by local authority (see figure 9.3); 1991 statistics subtracted from 2001 and population-weighted mean shown.
The Guardian, then its staunchest backer, was listing the basic achievements of that government as if they were greater achievements, as if repairing and rebuilding schools was some kind of rocket science:

Invited to embrace five more years of a Labour government, and of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister, it is hard to feel enthusiasm. Labour’s kneejerk critics can sometimes sound like the People’s Front of Judea asking what the Romans have ever done for us. The salvation of the health service, major renovation of schools, the minimum wage, civil partnerships and the extension of protection for minority groups are heroic, not small, achievements. (The Guardian, 30 April 2010)

However, the key and reiterated undertaking by the ‘New’ Labour administration that governed Britain in the early years of the twenty-first century was not honoured. This undertaking had been announced by Prime Minister Tony Blair in the annual Beveridge lecture of 1999: being poor, he said, ‘should not be a life sentence’: it was a ‘20 year mission – but I believe it can be done’ (BBC News, 1999). This pledge was reaffirmed by his successor Gordon Brown at the Labour Party conference of 2008:

Table 8.2 Geographical inequalities in health in Britain 1921–2007

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Ratio of worst to best:

| RII | 1.91   | 1.85   | 1.60   | 1.76   | 1.58   | 1.74   | 2.04   | 2.12     |

* Data series is not continuous, with no data for the 1940s and gaps in mid-1950s, mid-1960s, and from early 1970s to early 1980s; nor are time periods always of equal duration. For 1980, we used the harmonic mean of decile SMRs for the two periods of which it was composed (1981–85 and 1986–89).

Note: Confidence interval in original paper

Mapping the Thatcherite legacy

The Guardian, then its staunchest backer, was listing the basic achievements of that government as if they were greater achievements, as if repairing and rebuilding schools was some kind of rocket science:

Invited to embrace five more years of a Labour government, and of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister, it is hard to feel enthusiasm. Labour’s kneejerk critics can sometimes sound like the People’s Front of Judea asking what the Romans have ever done for us. The salvation of the health service, major renovation of schools, the minimum wage, civil partnerships and the extension of protection for minority groups are heroic, not small, achievements. (The Guardian, 30 April 2010)

However, the key and reiterated undertaking by the ‘New’ Labour administration that governed Britain in the early years of the twenty-first century was not honoured. This undertaking had been announced by Prime Minister Tony Blair in the annual Beveridge lecture of 1999: being poor, he said, ‘should not be a life sentence’: it was a ‘20 year mission – but I believe it can be done’ (BBC News, 1999). This pledge was reaffirmed by his successor Gordon Brown at the Labour Party conference of 2008:
Brown acknowledged that economic times were ‘tough’ but said the government was ‘in it for the long haul’ in the complete elimination of child poverty by 2020. He also promised to continue record investment in Sure Start and introduce free nursery education for two-year-olds in up to 60 areas. ‘For me, the fairer future starts with putting children first – with the biggest investment in children this country has ever seen. It means delivering the best possible starts in life with services tailored to the needs of every single precious child.’

(Ahmed, 1999)

However, by the time that the ‘New’ Labour government had departed the political stage, it was possible to make a more sober appraisal of the ‘Blair Years’ (1997–2007) in relation, at least, to the state of the nation’s children. The proportion of children living in a family that could not afford to take a holiday away from home had risen; so too had the number of children whose parents could not afford to let them have friends round for tea. Likewise, the number of children who were too poor to pursue a hobby and the number of children living in single-parent families without access to a car had risen. It all became much worse after 2010 with the economic crisis, partly because New Labour’s record was more like a continuation of Thatcherism rather than something new. In 1991 in his Beveridge lecture, Tony Blair had said: ‘In Beveridge’s time the welfare state was associated with progress and advancement. Today it is often associated with dependency, fraud, abuse, laziness. I want to make it once again a force for progress’ (BBC, 1999). However, in practice, ‘New’ Labour pursued that self-same populist and punitive approach, happy to label benefit claimants as feckless and to regard taxation as the Victorians had done – as charity, something one did for the poor.

This is not to deny that the New Labour government did achieve a great deal for children. It greatly reduced the numbers living in the worst poverty. It improved both education chances and narrowed education divides and it governed over a period when young peoples’ chances of gaining a job improved greatly, especially in the poorest areas, and national youth suicide rates fell quickly (in contrast to rises in young adult suicide rates during the previous Conservative administration). However, when it came to assessing their legacy as regards inequality overall, and inequality between the access to income and wealth enjoyed by different groups of children in the UK, their record was poor. The geography of Thatcherism became further entrenched.

Following on as the next wave of Thatcherism, New Labour also paved the way, in so many ways, for some of the worst policy decision of the next
(Coalition) government. They introduced student fees, which the next government would increase to £9,000 a year – the most expensive in Europe. They began the privatization of the National Health Service which the next government would then expand upon. And they allowed life chances between groups of young adults to diverge rapidly, which is why young parents today are bringing their children up in such widely different circumstances, often without knowing much of each others’ lives – less than their parents’ knew.

A heroic Labour government from 1997 to 2010 would have achieved so much more. It would have been heroic to have reduced income and wealth inequalities (and, by doing so, bring down rates of poverty towards normal western European levels). It would have been heroic to have refused to take part in America’s wars (as Labour refused when in power from 1964 to 1970). It would have been heroic to have reigned in the bankers before the crash. That kind of a government would have been comparable with other contemporary governments in other countries, with progressive politics in Britain’s past, and with the 1997 dream that ‘things can only get better’, New Labour fell far short. Here is what Julian Baggini had to say on Labour’s record in office in that same issue of *The Guardian* as quoted from above:

I think this has been an under-appreciated government. The last 13 years have been immeasurably better than the previous 18, and the return to Conservatism, in its current shape at least, appals me. But the game is up, both for a system which protects two parties which most people do not support, and a government that just cannot now hope to be re-elected with a majority.

(Baggini, 2010)

What do we find when, instead of announcing ‘immeasurably better’ we actually measure? Here are some attempts (with the help of many others) to measure this apparently immeasurable betterment. What is interesting is to note that when this is done we again do not appear to see too great a change from the Thatcherism to New Labour via John Major.

Among British adults during the 1997–2005 Blair years, the proportion unable to make regular savings rose from 25 per cent to 27 per cent; the number unable to afford an annual holiday away from home rose from 18 per cent to 24 per cent; and the national proportion who could not afford to insure the contents of their home climbed a percentage point, from 8 per cent to 9 per cent. However, these national proportions conceal the way in which the rising exclusion had hit particular groups especially hard, not
least a group that the Blair government had said it would help above all others: children living in poverty. The sources for all these facts are in Dorling (2011: 117–43). Brown’s very short term as prime minister was a little less damning statistically, but too short and turbulent a time to yet easily dovetail with the record to date.

Another failure of New Labour was its record on real rates of youth unemployment. They remained high throughout 1997–2010 so that just before the London riots of 2011 unemployment rates amongst young black men rose again to above 50 per cent. Rates for young black women had reached that level in 2009 (Figure 8.12). I say again, as this last occurred when Mrs Thatcher was in power.

The comparison of poverty surveys taken towards the start and end of Tony Blair’s time in office found that, of all children, the proportion living in a family that could not afford to take a holiday away from home (or just

Figure 8.12 Unemployment rate of men and women, black and white, aged 16–24, 2006–11, Q4, United Kingdom

to visit relatives) rose between 1999 and 2005, from 25 per cent to 32 per cent. This occurred even as the real incomes of most of the poorest rose; they just rose more for the affluent, making holidays more expensive for all and subtly changing what it meant to go on holiday. Similarly, as the rich became richer and housing became more expensive and more unequally distributed, the number of school-age children who had to share their bedroom with an adult or sibling over the age of 10 and of the opposite sex rose from 8 per cent to 15 per cent nationally.

Encouraging buy-to-let landlords in a new wave of privatization did not help reduce overcrowding. It was in London that such overcrowding became most acute and where sharing rooms rose most quickly. Keeping up appearances for the poor in London was much harder than in Britain as a whole, not simply because London had less space, but because within London other children were so often very wealthy. Greatly reducing the numbers of children living in households below 60 per cent of median incomes still leaves many children in those households and in some cases it became harder to achieve the child poverty goal in 2005 as compared to 1999 as overall inequalities increased as mean incomes rose faster than mediums. Even among children at the same school, the incomes of their parents had diverged and, consequently, standards of living and expectations of the norm did too.

Nationally, the proportion of children who said their parent(s) could not afford to let them have friends round for tea doubled, from 4 per cent to 8 per cent. The proportion who could not afford to pursue a hobby or other leisure activity also rose, from 5 per cent to 7 per cent, and the proportion who could not afford to go on a school trip at least once a term doubled, from 3 per cent to 6 per cent. For children aged below the age of 5, the proportion whose parents could not afford to take them to playgroup each week also doubled under the Blair government, from 3 per cent to 6 per cent.

Concealing poverty becomes ever more difficult in an age of high and increasingly unequal consumer consumption and it becomes easier for us to imagine why someone might be tempted to go further into debt in order to pay for a playgroup rather than spend another day at home with a toddler or to pay for a school trip rather than asking their child to pretend to be ill that day. Debt rose greatly amongst families with children under New Labour (or the continuation of Thatcherism as argued here). The worse-off resorted to the increasing number of dodgy lending and saving schemes set up by loan sharks or Christmas clubs such as ‘Farepak’ which
went bust. One Farepak victim made it clear what growing inequality meant:

I have got four children, all at various ages. Like I say, you can’t tell the little two, Father Christmas can call next door, but he can’t call here you know. And with my husband being on sick as well, having to pay the mortgage and feed four kids and whatever, and £37 a week is not a lot.

(Spalek and King, 2007)

The second most expensive of all consumption items are housing costs – rents or mortgages – and these have also diverged as income inequalities have increased. Having to move to a poorer area, or being unable to move out of one, is the geographical reality of social exclusion. People get further into debt trying to avoid this. The most expensive consumer item is a car. The combination of the expense and necessity of car ownership is the reason why not having a car is, for many, a contemporary mark of social failure. It is also closely connected to why so many car firms were badly hit so early on in the crash of 2008, as they were selling debt as much as selling cars.

By 2008/9, two out of three children in Britain living in a household without a car were living with only one parent. The chattels and behaviour that signal what it means to be poor change over time and in accordance with what most others have. By 2009, for a family not having a car outside London, like not being able to go on the cheapest of summer holidays, spelled stigma.

This was the outcome of having a government that was seriously relaxed about the rich becoming richer – ‘as long as they paid their taxes’. (But New Labour cut Her Majesty’s Revenue staff, thereby reducing tax inspectors’ abilities to chase the rich for their payments.) The gaps between all families grew: celebrity, entrepreneur, affluent, hard-working, a bit slovenly, and down-in-the-mouth. Council housing became social housing with the word ‘social’ denoting implications of charity rather than rights.

Taxation became viewed by some in New Labour as a form of charity; something one ‘did’ for the poor. Jobseeker’s Allowance of £9 a day was fine (as long as ‘one’ never imagined having to live off it oneself). But charity, or child tax credits, or Sure Start centres are simply not enough if the income gaps between people are allowed to turn into chasms. Whether our gaps can be considered cracks or chasms can be established by looking at other similarly affluent societies.

International comparisons of the quintile range of income inequality are some of the most telling comparisons that can be made between countries.
By 2005, after eight years of New Labour government, the richest fifth received 7.2 times more income on average than the poorest fifth each year – up from 6.9 times in 1997. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s Annual Report (the most widely used source), this ratio was 6.1 to 1 in Ireland; 5.6 to 1 in France; 4.0 to 1 in Sweden; and 3.4 to 1 in Japan. By contrast, in the USA that same ratio of inequality was 8.5 to 1. Between 1997 and 2005 the UK moved 0.3 points towards US levels of inequality, or almost one-quarter of the way along the path to becoming as socially unequal as people are in the USA.

The great and the good of New Labour mostly cared. But caring was not enough given thinking that had been rewired by too many years of living under growing inequality, of living under Thatcherism. The people who make up what is left of the party that governed until 6 May 2010 mostly know that it made huge mistakes, that what it did was not enough compared with what most other politicians in most other affluent countries in the world achieve today; not enough compared with what the 1906 or 1910 or 1945 or 1964, or even the 1974 governments achieved, all with less time and far less money.

Conclusion

Thatcherism has shaped the contemporary human geography of the UK as surely as glaciation shaped its physical geography. Thatcherism cut through what was there before, brought great industrial cities to near ruin and elevated many small southern rural towns that had only recently been places of monotony or poverty to rise to become sought after (if often soulless) dormitory villages for London. Just how appropriate the term Thatcherism will be we will not be sure of until we know that the epoch is truly over. We already know it has not occurred elsewhere in the world in the form in which it rose in the UK. Perhaps it was part of the death-throes of Empire? We now know that in many other affluent countries some equalities grew during the 1980s. The concept of Thatcherism, however, is likely to be a both an idea and a label that sticks, not least because 1978/79 now appears to have been such a seminal turning point in many key historical series. Above I have concentrated on economic inequalities and how they rose from that point on (Hills et al., 2010), but inequalities in health turned then too (Table 8.2), as did inequalities in wealth (Townsend, 1993), which also rose just a few years later (wealth
lags). Even inequalities in the murder rate rose as Thatcherism grew in ascendance (Dorling et al., 2008).

No one in the USA would call what happened there ‘Thatcherite’, and likewise the acolytes of Thatcherism were not simply aping Mr Reagan and the men who did that president’s thinking for him. It was political glaciation in the USA too, but of a different kind. It is worth reiterating that the UK Thatcherism may well, in part, have been a long-delayed reaction to loss of empire. Reaganomics, in hindsight, was about still building an empire, still fighting the Cold War. Thatcherism was turning back the progressive tide and promoting, again, inequality. And then, in 2010 came the Coalition. Initially the poor became much poorer while most of the rich became richer. At the very top the incomes of FTSE executives continued to rise so fast that the declining value of the pound could not dent their abilities to holiday as before. But that was ‘initially’. There were signs during 2012 that disgust with the rich might be growing and, in effect, disgust with the intellectual project of Thatcherism was growing. However, there were also signs of continued fear of the poor and even more reluctance to support welfare payments among the population as a whole as when Mrs Thatcher herself was making cuts. And the basic lie of Thatcherism continued: that everyone could become rich if only they tried hard enough. That if you had not become rich it was simply because you either had not tried hard enough or that you did not have the ‘potential’ to be a tall poppy in you. When that view is seen as an ideology and not as ‘common sense’, Thatcherism will have ended.

References


